Miyata Ryo

写真a

Title

Associate Professor

Researcher Number(JSPS Kakenhi)

30336383
To the head of this page.▲

Current Affiliation Organization 【 display / non-display 】

  • Duty   University of the Ryukyus   Faculty of Global and Regional Studies   economic program   Associate Professor  

  • Concurrently   University of the Ryukyus   Graduate School of Community Engagement and Development   Economics and Management   Associate Professor  

To the head of this page.▲

Academic degree 【 display / non-display 】

  • Yokohama National University -  Doctor of Philosophy

To the head of this page.▲

External Career 【 display / non-display 】

  • 2004.10
    　
    　

    University of the Ryukyus, Faculty of Law and Letters, Department of Comprehensive Social Systems Studies, Comparative Economic Analysis, Associate Professor  

To the head of this page.▲

Affiliated academic organizations 【 display / non-display 】

  • 1900.04
    -
    Now
     

    Japanese Economic Association 

To the head of this page.▲

Research Interests 【 display / non-display 】

  • Economic growth theory

  • 金融契約の理論

  • Economic growth theory

To the head of this page.▲

Thesis 【 display / non-display 】

  • 不完備契約、イノヴェーション及び経済発展

    2000.03

To the head of this page.▲

Published Papers 【 display / non-display 】

  • The Dynamics of Takeovers through Exchange Offers in the Presence of Competition

    宮田　亮,　鈴木　輝好,　八木　恭子

    Discussion Paper, Series A ( 北海道大学 )  362   2022.03

    Type of publication: Research paper (bulletin of university, research institution)

    　View Summary

    This study examines the characteristics of takeovers in the presence of competition using a threestage model. We first investigate the property of the equilibrium of mergers and takeovers in a frictionless market, and then analyze the effect that the existence of the competitors had on this process. We apply a general surplus function, rather than a specific one, eliminating the modifying effects of this factor from our study. Our model predicts that the existence of heavy competition in the takeover increases the number of unsuccessful or incomplete deals. Furthermore, we find that the shareholders of the target in a competitive market can choose the timing of accepting an offer, without the need to observe the surplus benefit of the deal. Our model shows that the presence of competition does not always provide the target shareholders with an advantage.

To the head of this page.▲